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Abstract 
 
In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s 
life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they 
make the opposite judgment.  Researchers have identified two general 
factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level:  (1) the 
agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or 
merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the 
victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or “personal.”  Here we 
integrate these two classes of findings.  Two experiments examine a novel 
personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when 
the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s 
muscles (e.g., in pushing).  Experiments 1a-b demonstrate the influence of 
personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact 
and spatial proximity.  Experiments 2a-b demonstrate an interaction 
between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force 
depends entirely on intention.  These studies also introduce a method for 
controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving 
potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.   3 
1. Introduction 
Many moral and political controversies involve a tension between 
individual rights and the greater good (Singer, 1979).  This tension is 
nicely captured by a puzzle known as the “Trolley Problem” that has long 
interested philosophers (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1985) and that has 
recently become a topic of sustained neuroscientific (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, 
Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; J. D. Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2004; J. D. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005; Schaich 
Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006) and 
psychological (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; J. Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; M Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & 
Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2000, 2007; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Nichols & 
Mallon, 2005; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) investigation.  One version of 
the trolley problem is as follows:  A runaway trolley is about to run over 
and kill five people.  In the switch dilemma
1 one can save them by hitting a 
switch that will divert the trolley onto a side-track, where it will kill only one 
person.  In the footbridge dilemma one can save them by pushing 
someone off a footbridge and into the trolley’s path, killing him, but 
stopping the trolley.  Most people approve of the five-for-one tradeoff in   4 
the switch dilemma, but not in the footbridge dilemma (Cushman et al., 
2006; Greene et al., 2001; Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993). 
What explains this pattern of judgment?  Neuroimaging (Greene, et 
al., 2001, 2004), lesion (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Mendez et al., 2005), and behavioral (Bartels, 2008; J. Greene et al., 
2008; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) studies indicate that people respond 
differently to these two cases because the action in the footbridge 
dilemma elicits a stronger negative emotional response.  But what 
features of this action elicit this response?  Recent studies implicate two 
general factors.  First, following Aquinas (unknown/2006), many appeal to 
intention and, more specifically, the distinction between harm intended as 
a means to a greater good (as in the footbridge dilemma) and harm that is 
a foreseen but “unintended” side-effect of achieving a greater good (as in 
the switch dilemma) (Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 
2000; Schaich Borg et al., 2006).  Second, many studies appeal to varying 
forms of “directness” or “personalness,” including physical contact 
between agent and victim (Cushman et al., 2006), the locus of intervention 
(victim vs. threat) in the action’s underlying causal model (Waldmann & 
Dieterich, 2007), whether the action involves deflecting an existing threat 
(Greene et al., 2001), and whether the harmful action is mechanically   5 
mediated (Moore et al., 2008; Royzman & Baron, 2002).  The aim of this 
paper is to integrate these two lines of research. 
We present two experiments examining a directness/personalness 
factor that we call personal force.  An agent applies personal force to 
another when the force that directly impacts the other is generated by the 
agent’s muscles, as when one pushes another with one’s hands or with a 
rigid object.  Thus, applications of personal force, so defined, cannot be 
mediated by mechanisms that respond to the agent’s muscular force by 
releasing or generating a different kind of force and applying it to the other 
person.  Although all voluntary actions that affect others involve muscular 
contractions, they do not necessarily involve the application of personal 
force to another person.  For example, firing a gun at someone or 
dropping a weight onto someone by releasing a lever do not involve the 
application of personal force because the victims in such cases are 
directly impacted by a force that is distinct from the agent’s muscular 
force, i.e. by the force of an explosion or gravity.  The cases of direct harm 
examined by Royzman and Baron (2002) are not so direct as to involve 
the application of personal force.  The direct/indirect distinction described 
by Moore and colleagues (2008) is similar to the distinction drawn here 
between personal and impersonal force, but Moore and colleagues do not 
systematically distinguish between physical contact and personal force.   6 
Experiments 1a-b aim to document the influence of personal force, 
contrasting its effect with those of physical contact (1a-b) and spatial 
proximity (1a) between agent and victim.  Experiment 1a also introduces a 
method for controlling for effects of unconscious realism, i.e. a tendency to 
unconsciously replace a moral dilemma’s unrealistic assumptions with 
more realistic ones.  (“Trying to stop a trolley with a person is unlikely to 
work.”)  Experiments 2a-b examine the interaction between personal force 
and intention.  More specifically, we ask whether the effect of personal 
force depends on intention and vice versa. 
 
 
2. Experiment 1a 
We compared four versions of the footbridge dilemma to isolate the effects 
of spatial proximity, physical contact, and personal force on moral 
judgments concerning harmful actions.  We also tested the unconscious 
realism hypothesis by controlling for subjects’ real-world expectations. 
 
2.1 Method 
Subjects   7 
Subjects were 271 females, 337 males, and 12 gender unknown.  
The mean age was 31.  Subjects were recruited anonymously in public 
venues in New York City and Boston.  Subjects were paid $3. 
 
Design, materials, and procedure 
Subjects responded to one of four versions of the footbridge dilemma 
in a between-subject design, indicating the extent to which the proposed 
action is “morally acceptable.”  In the standard footbridge dilemma (n = 
154, Figure 1a), the agent (named Joe) may save the five by pushing the 
victim off the footbridge using his hands.  This action involves spatial 
proximity, physical contact, and personal force.  In the remote footbridge 
dilemma (n = 82, Figure 1d), Joe may drop the victim onto the tracks using 
a trap door and a remote switch.  This action involves none of the three 
aforementioned factors.  The footbridge pole dilemma (n = 72, Figure 1b) 
is identical to the standard footbridge dilemma except that Joe uses a pole 
rather than his hands to push the victim.  This dilemma involves spatial 
proximity and personal force without physical contact.  The footbridge 
switch dilemma (n = 160, Figure 1c) is identical to the remote footbridge 
dilemma except that Joe and the switch are adjacent to the victim.  This 
dilemma involves spatial proximity without physical contact or personal 
force.  Comparing remote footbridge to footbridge switch isolates the   8 
effect of spatial proximity. Comparing standard footbridge to footbridge 
pole isolates the effect of physical contact. Comparing footbridge switch to 
footbridge pole isolates the effect of personal force. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Diagrams for the (a) standard footbridge dilemma (physical 
contact, spatial proximity, and personal force), (b) footbridge pole dilemma 
(spatial proximity and personal force), (c) footbridge switch dilemma 
(spatial proximity), and (d) remote footbridge dilemma.  (Panels b-d depict 
details of diagrams presented to subjects with labels and some pictorial 
elements removed for clarity.) 
 
The text of the standard footbridge dilemma is as follows:   9 
 
An empty runaway trolley is speeding down a set of tracks toward five 
railway workmen. There is a footbridge above the tracks in between 
the runaway trolley and the five workmen.  On this footbridge is a 
railway workman wearing a large, heavy backpack.  If nothing is done, 
the trolley will proceed down the main tracks and cause the deaths of 
the five workmen. (See diagram below) 
 
It is possible to avoid these five deaths.  Joe is a bystander who 
understands what is going on and who happens to be standing right 
behind the workman on the footbridge.  Joe sees that he can avoid the 
deaths of the five workmen by pushing the workman with the heavy 
backpack off of the footbridge and onto the tracks below.  The trolley 
will collide with the workman, and the combined weight of the 
workman and the backpack will be enough to stop the trolley, avoiding 
the deaths of the five workmen.  But the collision will cause the death 
of the workman with the backpack. 
 
Note: Joe cannot avoid the deaths of the five workmen by jumping 
himself because he is not heavy enough to stop the trolley.  There is 
also not enough time to remove the backpack from the workman.   10 
 
Is it morally acceptable for Joe to push the workman off of the 
footbridge in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen, causing 
the death of the single workman instead? 
 
Subjects answered (YES/NO) and rated the moral acceptability of the 
action on a nine-point scale.  The above text was accompanied by a 
diagram (Figure 1a).  Similar text and diagrams (Figures 1c-d and 3) were 
used for other dilemmas, with changes reflecting the experimental 
manipulations.  Complete materials are available at [url]. 
The instructions acknowledged that the dilemmas were not 
necessarily realistic and requested that subjects “suspend disbelief.”  Data 
from 31 (of 664) subjects who reported being unable/unwilling to suspend 
disbelief (“conscious realists”) were excluded form analysis, as were data 
from 10 subjects reporting confusion. 
To control for unconscious realism, we asked subjects (after they 
responded to the dilemma) to report on their real-world expectations 
concerning the likely consequences of Joe’s actions.  Subjects estimated 
the likelihood (0-100%) that the consequences of Joe’s action would be 
(a) as described in the dilemma (five lives saved at the cost of one), (b) 
worse than this, or (c) better than this.  These estimates (respectively   11 
labeled PLAN, WORSE, and BETTER) were modeled as covariates. The 
predictive value of these variables indicates the extent to which subjects’ 
judgments may reflect unconscious realism.  
Data were analyzed using a general linear model.  Here and in 
Experiment 2a, the three “realism covariates” and gender were included 
as first-order covariates and allowed to interact with the dilemma variable.  
In Experiment 2a these factors were allowed to interact with both main 
effects and the interaction of interest.  Because the realism covariates are 
likely correlated, this analysis is adequate to control for the their collective 
effects but inadequate to resolve their respective contributions. 
 
 
2.2 Results  
Ratings of the moral acceptability of sacrificing one life to save five 
differed among the four dilemmas (F(3, 417) = 9.69,  p < .0001).  Planned 
pairwise contrasts revealed no significant effect of spatial proximity 
(remote footbridge vs. footbridge switch: F(1, 417) = .11 p = .74), no 
significant effect of physical contact (standard footbridge vs. footbridge 
pole: F(1, 417) = 1.43. p = .23), but a significant effect of personal force 
(footbridge switch vs. footbridge pole: F(1, 417) = 7.63, p = .006, d = .40).  
(See Figure 2)  There was a significant main effect of WORSE (F(1, 417)   12 
= 5.80, p = .02) with actions expected to be less successful eliciting lower 
moral acceptability ratings, consistent with unconscious realism.  There 
were no significant effects of PLAN, BETTER, gender, or higher order 
covariates (p > .05). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1:  Moral acceptability ratings for four 
dilemmas in which the proposed harmful actions vary in their involvement 
of physical contact, spatial proximity, and personal force.  Error bars 
indicate SEM.  Numbers within graph bars indicate mean and SEM, 
adjusted for effects of covariates. 
   13 
  These results indicate that harmful actions involving personal force 
are judged to be less morally acceptable.  Moreover, they suggest that 
spatial proximity and physical contact between agent and victim have no 
effect and that a previously reported effect of physical contact (Cushman 
et al., 2006) is in fact an effect of personal force.  In all four of the 
dilemmas examined in this study, the harmful event is intended as a 
means to achieving the agent’s goal, raising the possibility that the effect 
of personal force is limited to cases in which the harm is intended as a 
means.  Experiments 2a-b examine the interaction between personal force 
and intention. 
 
3. Experiment 1b 
 
To ensure that the results concerning personal force and physical contact 
observed in Experiment 1a generalize to other contexts, we conducted an 
additional experiment using a different set of moral dilemmas, as well as a 
different rating scale.  
 
3.1 Method 
Subjects   14 
Subjects were 54 females and 37 males, with a mean age of 31.  
Subjects were unpaid and recruited anonymously through the Alkami 
Biobehavioral Institute’s Research Subject Volunteer Program 
(http://rsvp.alkami.org/), Psychological Research on the Net 
(http://psych.hanover.edu/Research/exponnet.html), and Craigslist 
(http://www.craigslist.org).  Subjects participated through the 
Greene/Moral Cognition Lab’s online research page: 
https://mcl.wjh.harvard.edu/online.html. 
 
Design, materials, and procedure 
  Subjects responded to one of three versions of the speedboat 
dilemma (Cushman et al., 2006), in which saving the lives of five drowning 
swimmers requires lightening the load of a speedboat.  This requires 
removing from the speedboat a passenger who cannot swim, causing that 
passenger to drown.  In the first version (Pc-Pf), the agent pushes the 
victim with his hands, employing physical contact and personal force.  In 
the second version (NoPc-Pf), the agent pushes the victim with an oar, 
employing personal force, but no physical contact.  In the third version 
(NoPc-NoPf), the agent removes the victim by accelerating quickly, 
causing the victim to tumble off the back of the boat.  This employs neither 
personal force nor body contact.   Following Cushman et al. (2006),   15 
subjects evaluated the agent’s action using a seven-point scale with 1 
labeled “Forbidden,” 4 labeled “Permissible,” and 7 labeled “Obligatory.”  
 
3.2 Results 
Ratings varied significantly among the three dilemmas (M (SD) for Pc-Pf = 
2.28 (1.50); NoPc-Pf = 2.33 (1.20); NoPc-NoPf = 3.3 (1.58); F(2, 87) = 
4.72,  p = .01).  As predicted, planned contrasts revealed no significant 
effect of physical contact (Pc-Pf vs. NoPc-Pf: F(1, 87) = .02 p = .89), but a 
significant effect of personal force (NoPc-Pf vs. NoPc-NoPf: F(1, 87) = 
5.86, p = .02, d = .69). 
 
4. Experiment 2a 
This experiment examined the independent effects of personal force and 
intention and, most critically, their interaction, by comparing four dilemmas 
using a 2 (personal force absent vs. present) x 2 (means vs. side-effect) 
design.  
 
4.1 Method 
Methods follow Experiment 1a unless otherwise noted.   
 
Subjects   16 
Subjects were 181 females, 179 males, and 6 gender unknown.  
Mean age: 31.  An additional 44 subjects were excluded for 
“realism”/confusion. 
 
Design, materials, and procedure 
Each subject responded to one of four dilemmas.  In the loop 
dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2000; Thomson, 1985; Waldmann 
& Dieterich, 2007), Joe may save the five by turning the trolley onto a 
looped side-track that reconnects with the main track at a point before the 
five people (n = 152, Figure 3a).  There is a single person on the side-
track who will be killed if the trolley is turned, but who will prevent the 
trolley from looping back and killing the five.  Here the victim is harmed as 
a means (i.e. intentionally), but without the application of personal force.  
The loop weight dilemma (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2000) is identical 
to the loop dilemma except that a heavy weight positioned behind the 
victim on the side-track, rather than the victim, stops the trolley (n = 74, 
Figure 3b).  Here the victim is killed as a side-effect (i.e. without intention) 
and, again, without the application of personal force.  In the obstacle 
collide dilemma, the victim is positioned on a high and narrow footbridge in 
between Joe and a switch that must be hit in order to turn the trolley and 
save the five (n = 70, Figure 3c).  To reach the switch in time, Joe must   17 
run across the footbridge, which will, as a side-effect, involve his colliding 
with the victim, knocking him off the footbridge and to his death.  Thus, 
this dilemma involves personal force, but not intention.  The obstacle push 
dilemma (n = 70) is identical to the obstacle collide dilemma except that 
Joe must push the victim out of the way in order to get to the switch.  
Although the victim is not used to stop the trolley, Joe performs a distinct 
body movement (pushing) that is both harmful and necessary for the 
achievement of the goal.  Thus, this dilemma involves the application of 
personal force that is intentional. 
 
 
Figure 3. Diagrams for the (a) loop dilemma (means, no personal force), 
(b) loop weight dilemma (side-effect, no personal force), (c) obstacle push 
dilemma (means, personal force), and obstacle collide dilemma (side-  18 
effect, personal force).  Remote switches (as in Figure 1d) not shown in 
panels a-b. 
 
4.2 Results 
There was a main effect of intention (loop and obstacle push vs. loop 
weight and obstacle collide: F(1, 329) = 6.47,  p = .01) and no main effect 
of personal force (loop dilemmas vs. obstacle dilemmas: F(1, 329) = 4.85,  
p = .29).  Crucially, we observed the predicted interaction between 
intention and personal force (F(1, 329) = 7.54,  p = .006, partial η
2 = .02).  
A series of planned pairwise contrasts clarified the nature of this 
interaction:  Comparing the loop, loop weight, and obstacle collide 
dilemmas revealed no significant effects (p > .2), while the obstacle push 
dilemma elicited significantly lower moral acceptability ratings than each of 
these other dilemmas (obstacle push vs. others, respectively: F(1, 329) = 
8.20, 5.56, and 11.85; p = .004, .02, .0006).   (See Figure 4.)  This 
suggests that the main effect of intention reported above is explained by 
the conjoint effect of personal force and intention (i.e. by the uniquely low 
moral acceptability ratings elicited by the obstacle push dilemma).  There 
were significant effects of WORSE (F(1, 329) = 15.80,  p < .0001) and 
PLAN (F(1, 329) = 19.21,  p < .0001).  Males tended toward higher moral 
acceptability ratings (F(1, 329) = 4.99,  p = .03), particularly in the absence   19 
of personal force (gender x personal force: (F(1, 329) = 6.54,  p = .01).  
There was no significant effect of BETTER or other higher order 
covariates (p > .05). 
    
 
 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2:  Moral acceptability ratings for four 
dilemmas in which the proposed harmful actions vary in their intentional 
status (means vs. side-effect) and the presence/absence of personal 
force.  Error bars indicate SEM.  Numbers within graph bars indicate mean 
and standard deviation, adjusted for effects of covariates. 
 
5. Experiment 2b   20 
 
To ensure that the main results observed in Experiment 2a generalize to 
other contexts, we recoded and reanalyzed the data from Cushman et al. 
(2006).  More specifically, we examined the moral permissibility ratings for 
the 19 moral dilemmas involving actions (rather than omissions), including 
5 dilemmas in which the harm is caused as a means without personal 
force (Means-noPf), 6 dilemmas in which the harm is caused as a side-
effect without personal force (SE-noPf), 3 dilemmas in which the harm is 
caused as a means with personal force (Means-Pf), and 5 dilemmas in 
which the harm is caused as a side-effect with personal force (SE-Pf).  
Dilemma codings followed those of Cushman et al., with personal force 
replacing physical contact, except that two dilemmas not involving 
physical contact were deemed (prior to analysis) to involve personal force.  
(See online supplementary materials.)  Because our interest here is in 
testing the generalizability of our results across contexts, we used 
dilemma/item, rather than subject, as the unit of analysis. 
  Ratings varied significantly among the four dilemma types (M (SD) 
for Means-NoPf = 3.58 (.55); SE-NoPf = 4.25 (.37); Means-Pf = 2.92 (.44); 
SE-Pf = 4.53 (.35); F(3, 15) = 10.93,  p = .0005).  There was a main effect 
of intention: F(1, 15) = 31.08,  p < .0001) and no main effect of personal 
force (F(1, 15) = .90,  p = .36).  Crucially, we observed the predicted   21 
interaction between intention and personal force (F(1, 15) = 5.35,  p = .04, 
partial η
2 = .26).  As predicted, the simple effect of personal force was 
significant when the harm was a means (F(1, 15) = 4.49, p = .05),  but not 
when the harm was a side-effect (F(1, 15) = 1.14, p = .30), indicating that 
the effect of personal force depends on intention.  In this experiment, 
however, the effect of intention was not only significant in the presence of 
personal force (F(1, 15) = 26.24, p = .0001), but also in the absence of 
personal force, albeit more weakly (F(1, 15) = 6.43, p = .02). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
In two sets of experiments, harmful actions were judged to be less morally 
acceptable when the agent applied personal force to the victim.  In 
Experiments 1a-b the effect of personal force was documented and 
distinguished from effects of physical contact (Cushman et al., 2006) and 
spatial proximity (1a only), which were not significant.  Experiments 2a-b 
revealed that personal force interacts with intention, such that the personal 
force factor only affects moral judgments of intended harms, while the 
intention factor is enhanced in cases involving personal force.  Put simply, 
something special happens when intention and personal force co-occur.    22 
(We note that all key results held using categorical (YES/NO) judgments 
when they were collected.) 
In Experiments 2a-b, personal force exhibited no effect in the 
absence of intention, a striking result in light of Experiments 1a-b and 
previous work.  In Experiment 2a, the action in the obstacle collide 
dilemma was judged to be as acceptable as those in the loop, and loop 
weight dilemmas despite the fact that obstacle collide, unlike the other two 
dilemmas, involves direct harm (Moore et al., 2008; Royzman & Baron, 
2002), physical contact (Cushman et al., 2006), harm not caused by the 
deflection of an existing threat (Greene et al., 2001), and an alteration of 
the victim’s causal path (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).  (One may 
interpret Waldmann & Dieterich as assuming that victim interventions are 
necessarily intended, in which case this result is consistent with their 
theory.)  Experiment 2b showed that this finding generalizes to several 
additional dilemma contexts, strongly suggesting that the effect of 
personal force is limited to cases involving harm as a means. 
Experiments 2a and 2b also demonstrate that the effect of the 
intention factor on moral judgment is enhanced in cases involving 
personal force, and Experiment 2a found no effect of intention in the 
absence of personal force, suggesting that intention operates only in 
conjunction with other factors such as, but not necessarily limited to,   23 
personal force.  Our finding of equivalence between the loop (intentional 
harm) and loop weight (harmful side-effect) dilemmas directly contradicts 
some earlier findings (Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2000),
2 but is 
consistent with other earlier findings (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).   
Following Waldmann & Dieterich, we attribute the effects observed by 
Hauser et al. (2007) and Mikhail (2000) to a confound whereby the loop 
dilemma, but not the loop weight dilemma, refers to the victim as a “heavy 
object.”  (“There is a heavy object on the side track…  The heavy object is 
1 man…” vs. “There is a heavy object on the side track… There is 1 man 
standing on the side track in front of the heavy object…”). 
  The statistical significance of the “unconscious realism” covariates 
included in Experiments 1a and 2a provides limited support for the 
unconscious realism hypothesis.  This support is limited for at least two 
reasons.  First, subjects’ assessments of the likely real-world effects of the 
actions in question may be post-hoc rationalizations (Haidt, 2001).  
Second, a correlation between real-world expectations and moral 
judgments is not sufficient to establish a causal relationship.  
Nevertheless, these results indicate that effects of unconscious realism 
may be real and that researchers who use hypothetical cases to study 
decision-making should consider controlling for such effects as done here.   24 
  One might wonder why the actions judged to be more acceptable in 
Experiment 1a (footbridge switch and remote footbridge) received 
comparable ratings (~5) to the action judged to be less acceptable in 
Experiment 2a (obstacle push).  First, in considering why the footbridge 
switch and remote footbridge dilemmas received relatively low ratings, we 
speculate that this may be due to the fact that the actions in these 
dilemmas involve dropping the victim onto the tracks, constituting an 
additional intentional harm (Mikhail, 2007).  Second, in considering why 
the ratings for the obstacle push dilemma are relatively high, we suggest 
that this may be due to the fact that the action in the obstacle push 
dilemma, while involving a distinct body movement that is harmful and 
necessary for the achievement of the goal, does not involve using the 
victim, as in the four footbridge dilemmas.  Each of these hypotheses will 
be explored in future work. 
  The latter hypothesis highlights more general open questions 
concerning the scope of agents’ intentions (Bennett, 1995).  In the 
obstacle push dilemma, the pushing is necessary, but the consequent 
harm, strictly speaking, is not.  This observation raises parallel questions 
about more paradigmatic cases of intentional harm.  For example, one 
might claim that even in the standard footbridge dilemma the harm is 
unintentional because the agent merely intends to use the victim’s body to   25 
stop the trolley, harming him only as a foreseen side-effect of doing this.  
These observations highlight the need for a theory of intentional event 
segmentation (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). 
Other open questions concern the proper characterization of 
personal force:  Must it be continuous (as in pushing), or may it be ballistic 
(as in throwing)?  Is pulling equivalent to pushing?  We acknowledge, 
more broadly, that the effects documented here under the rubric of 
“personal force” may ultimately be refined and reinterpreted.  For example, 
alternative interpretations may focus on the potential for dynamic 
interaction between agent and victim. 
Finally, we consider the significance of our finding that personal 
force and intention interact:  Why is it that the combined presence of 
personal force and intention pushes our moral buttons?  The co-
dependence of these factors suggests a system of moral judgment that 
operates over an integrated representation of goals and personal force—
representations such as “goal-within-the-reach-of-muscle-force.”  In a 
general sense, this suggests a mechanism of moral judgment that is a 
species of embodied cognition (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Prinz, 2002; Wilson, 2002).  One natural source 
of such embodied goal representations is system of action planning that 
coordinates the application of personal force to objects to achieve goal-  26 
states for those specific objects.  A putative sub-system of moral 
judgment, monitoring such action plans, might operate by rejecting any 
plan that entails harm as a goal-state (Mikhail, 2000, 2007) to be achieved 
through the direct application of personal force.  We propose this “action-
planning” account of the present results as an important area for further 
research. 
 At a more general level, the present study strongly suggests that 
our sense of an action’s moral wrongness is tethered to its more basic 
motor properties, and specifically that the intention factor is intimately 
bound up with our sensitivity to personal force.  This perspective contrasts 
with at least some versions of the “universal moral grammar” perspective 
(Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2000, 2007), according to which the present moral 
judgments depend on goal representations of the kind one might find in a 
legal system, leaving little room for an ‘embodied’ representation involving 
personal force.  It also presents a challenge to philosophical theories that 
endorse the doctrine of double effect (i.e. the intention factor) on the basis 
of its intuitive plausibility (Aquinas, unknown/2006; Fischer & Ravizza, 
1992).  Will they bless its shotgun marriage to a normatively ugly bride: 
the doctrine of personal force? 
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Notes 
1Previously we have referred to this as the “trolley” dilemma (Greene et 
al., 2001). 
2This analysis had adequate power (.97) to detect a small effect (d = .2) 
trending weakly (p < .95) in the predicted direction, but none was 
observed.   28 
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